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Casenotes and Comments
TORT SUIT BY WIFE AGAINST HUSBAND'S
PARTNERSHIP-DAVID V. DAVID'
Plaintiff-appellant-wife brought an action against defendant-appellee-partnership for personal injuries sustained while upon the defendant's premises for business
purposes. Defendants filed the general issue plea and a
special plea setting up the marriage relation between the
plaintiff and one of the members of the defendant partnership. Plaintiff's demurrer to the plea was overruled
and a judgment of non pros was entered. On appeal the
principal question was whether a married woman is entitled to maintain an action for negligence against a partnership when at the time of the negligent act her husband
was a member of the partnership. Held: Judgment affirmed. Since a married woman cannot maintain an action
in tort against her husband, she cannot maintain such an
action against a partnership of which her husband is a
member. The same public policies control in the two cases.
It was well settled at common law that a married woman
could not sue her husband either in contract or in tort
because of the existence of the marital relation.2 Nor could
she sue her husband's partnership because the partnership under the common law theory was considered an aggregate of individuals,' and under the rule of joinder of
parties4 the husband would have to be made a party defendant although it was also necessary for the husband
to join the wife as co-plaintiff.5 Were this allowed, the rule
that a party cannot appear on both sides of the recordO
would be violated.
In 1898 the Maryland legislature passed the Married
Women's Act 7 which permits married women to sue either
1161 Md. 532, 157 At. 755, 81 A. L. R. 1100 (1931).
2 Barton v. Barton, 32 Md. 214 (1869).
3 McLane v. State Tax Comm., 156 Md. 133, 143 Atl. 656 (1928).
Smith v. Crichton, 33 Md. 103 (1870).
Sanarzevosky v. City Passenger Ry. Co., 88 Md. 479, 42 Atl. 206 (1898);
Treusch v. Kamke, 63 Md. 278 (1885).
6 Thompson v. Young, 90 Md. 72, 44 At 1037 (1899).
'Md. Code, Art. 45.
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in contract or in tort "as fully as if they were unmarried".' The question as to whether under this act a wife
could maintain suit against her husband on a deed of separation without the intervention of a trustee was expressly
left open in the case of Barclay v. Barclay,' but the court
remarked that "it would seem the question would be presented in a very different light since the Act of 1898. .... "
It has been suggested"0 that Sec. 20 of Art. 45 may have
grown out of the query in the Barclay case. This section
passed in 1900, provided that "a married woman may contract with her husband... and upon all such contracts...
may sue and be sued as fully as if she were a feme sole."
Under these two statutes it has been definitely decided that
the wife may maintain a suit in contract either in law or
in equity against her husband."
The question as to whether the Act allows a married
woman to sue her husband in a tort action was, squarely
presented in Furstenburg v. Furstenburg.2 In that case
the wife brought suit against the husband for injuries sustained as a result of his negligent operation of the car
in which she was riding with him. In holding that the wife
could not maintain the suit the court declared that the purpose of Section 5 of Article 45 was merely to give the wife
a remedy, by her suit alone, without the necessity of complying with the common law requirement of joinder of the
husband. "The intention to create, as between husband
and wife, personal causes of action, which did not exist
before the Act, is not, in our opinion, expressed by its
terms." This opinion was based on the fact that the legislature passed a separate Act" allowing the wife to sue
the husband in contract; and since no such express Act
in regard to tort suits was passed, the intent of the legislature must have been that no such action should be permitted. This decision places Maryland in line with the maIbid, Sec. 5.
'98 Md. 366, 375, 56 AtI. 804 (1904).
'0 Md. Code, Art. 45, Sec. 20, annotator's note.
Cochrane v. Cochrane, 139 Md. 530, 115 At. 811 (1921).
152 Md. 247, 136 At. 534 (1927).
"Md. Code, Art. 45, Sec. 20.
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jority view on the right of the wife to sue the husband in
tort. There is, however, an ever increasing minority which
offers weighty arguments to sustain the contrary view.1 4
It seems to be the well settled policy of the Court of
Appeals to refrain wherever possible from becoming concerned with domestic quarrels. Even in divorce suits where,
if ever, the function of the court is to deal with domestic
disputes, it has expressed its reluctance to interfere except
where "either of the parties has been guilty of such conduct as would make a continuance of the marital relation
inconsistent with the health, self-respect, and reasonable
comfort of the other,' 5 and has said: "It is not the function of the Court in such cases as this to arbitrate family
quarrels...."I" The same consideration applied in Schneider v. Schneider 7 where the mother brought an action in
tort against her minor son for injuries sustained in an automobile accident as a result of his negligence. In refusing
to allow the action the court said: "We need not dwell
upon the importance of maintaining the family relation
free . . . from the antagonisms which such suits imply."
This policy was adhered to in the Furstenburg case and
seems to be the underlying reason for the limited construction of the statute.
The rules forbidding tort suits between husbands and
wives and between parents and minor children"s would
seem to be based on two overlapping public policies, one,
that domestic quarrels should not be aired in the courtroom, and the other, that to permit such suits might tend
to disrupt the marital or family harmony, which is so socially desirable. This last policy ties in with several rules
of evidence which exclude otherwise admissible evidence
in order to foster marital harmony. Thus confidential communications between spouses are privileged in order to
11On the right of wife to sue husband for personal injuries, see 29 A.L.R.
1482; 33 A. L. R. 1406; 44 A. L. R. 794; 48 A. L. IL 293; 89 A. L. R. 118.
For list of states, see (1935) 21 Corn. L. Q. 157, 159.
187 Atl. 104, 105 (1936), quoting from
15Cohen v. Cohen, - Md. -,
Singewald v. Singewald, 165 Md. 136, 146, 166 Atl. 441, 446 (1933).
" Ibid.
1T 160 Md. 18, 152 Atl. 498 (1930).
8For tort actions between parent and child, see 81 A. L. R. 1157.
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encourage spouses to communicate confidential matters to
each other. Spouses are non-compellable to testify against
spo.uses because to allow this would disrupt the marital
harmony between them. The Lord Mansfield rule forbids
spouses to testify to that non-access which would "bastardize the issue" because of the marital policy against dragging the intimate relations of spouses into the courtroom.
Several years prior to the Schneider case, in Cochrane
v. Cochrane,9 the court had already held that a wife may
maintain a suit against the husband for the protection of
her property either in a court of equity or in a court of
law, and no mention was made of the public policy doctrine.
In the Furstenburg case this decision was disposed of by
the statement: "That the view is not inconsistent with our
conclusion in this case. . . ." The result of the two decisions is obvious: The wife may maintain suit against her
husband for a tort committed against her property but not
for one against her person.
It is difficult to sustain this distinction in legal principle
since in one case the Act was construed to give the wife
a substantive right of action she did not possess at common law, while in the other it was construed not to give
her a substantive right of action she did not possess at
common law. Also, as a matter of abstract justice, the validity of the distinction i8 questionable. In both cases her
rights have been invaded: yet in one she has legal redress, in the other she has none. It has been suggested
that she has a remedy in criminal proceedings, divorce,
etc.,20 but actually this is the equivalent to no remedy at
21
all.
As a practical matter, when we consider suits by the
wife, there are several arguments that may be advanced
for the validity of the distinction and undoubtedly courts
have had these in mind when making the rules. First, the
wife is entitled to the benefit of her husband's assets by

2 Supra

note 1.1.
2 Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611, 54 L. Ed. 1180, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep.
111 (1910).
21McCurdy, Torts Between Persons In Domestic Relations, (1930) 43 Har.
L. R. 1060, 10,52.
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virtue of her right to his support during his life. What
real benefit will she gain by securing a judgment against
him? He must pay her doctor's bills in any event and
support her to the extent of his assets for the rest of
their joint lives, unless divorced. But this argument fails
to support the rule when we consider the other side of the
picture, suits by the husband against the wife, which are
also forbidden. There is no such expedient argument to
support the denial of jurisdiction to entertain such tort
suits. This points to the second argument in favor of not
allowing tort suits between members of a family. The
way would be open for fraud upon indemnity insurance
companies. Even in the absence of fraud it would be allowing the husband to profit by his own wrong, since it
is evident the damages recovered by the wife would work
a practical benefit for him, regardless of the rule as to
separate estates of husband and wife. But whether the distinction is founded upon the public policy doctrine 22 announced by the court, or on the practical grounds not announced by the courts, but inherent in their rulings, it
seems desirable.
Turning to the principal case we find that the Court
again invokes the doctrine of public policy. Quoting from
State v. Oliver,23 the court says :24 " 'It is better to draw
the curtain, shut out the public gaze and leave the parties
to forget and forgive'. . . . It is apparent from what has
been said that, in our opinion, this case is controlled by
the Furstenberg case ...."
But in the David case, there was present no domestic
quarrel which needed to be "shut out of the public gaze".
The tort was not the wilful and direct action of the husband nor was it incidental to any personal relations. It
was due to the negligence of the partnership and its employees. The liability arose vicariously. There would
seem to be no reason why marital tranquility and bliss
should be disturbed by allowing such a suit. Further, none
2 For a criticism of the public policy doctrine, see Brown v. Brown, 88
Conn. 142, 89 Atl. 889, 891-892 (1914).
=70 N. C. 60 (1874).
161 Md.539.
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of the elements which lend themselves to the practical reasons noted above are present. The wife has no right to
support from the partnership. The fraud factor is absent, or at least remote and constant with tort suits generally. There is some question of the benefit to the husband but this is no reason for denying the wife legal redress under the circumstances. It seems clear that the
substantial reasons of policy supporting the Furstenburg
case are absent in the principal case.
As a matter of strict legal logic, however, the decision
is correct. It is a logical extension of the rule in the Furstenburg case, inasmuch as the court adopted the aggregate
rather than the entity theory of partnership. This refusal to view the partnership as an entity was based on the
fact that the "difference between a partnership and a legal
entity complete in itself ... is that each partner is severally
liable for the wrongful acts and omissions of the partnership, and that he is bound to contribute to his co-partners
his proportionate share of any sum advanced by them to
satisfy an enforceable demand against it". But is this
a necessary reason for refusing to invoke the entity theory? Can it not be argued that even though the judgment
obtained may be levied solely upon the property of the
husband or that he may be required to contribute to its
payment, the fact remains that the suit is against the partnership as such and not against any one individual.
Since the Married Women's Acts there is no longer
the argument that the husband would have to appear both
as plaintiff and defendant. The procedural barrier is removed. There is left only the question of public policy in
allowing tort suits between members of the same family.
Unquestionably, much may be said for the legalistic
reasoning of the court but the result it reaches is functionally undesirable. It has been suggested that the adoption of the entity theory requires resort to fiction. This
is true, but courts on other occasions have not hesitated
to adopt fictions where justice so required, and no conceivable harm would result from employing them. "At times
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. . . changes in economic conditions and in legal concepts
have not coincided, and the courts, in the interest of substantial justice, have adopted dogmatic fictions to suit the
particular case whose circumstances did not seem to find
an adequate remedy in the logical application of old established theories."'25 It is submitted that the court with
equally good reasoning could have reached a more desirable result here.
In summary, it is seen that in Maryland a wife may
maintain an action ex contractu against her husband, and
an action ex delicto where the tort is committed against her
property. She may not sue the husband for torts committed
by him against her person, nor may she maintain such an
action against his partnership, though the partnership is
the wrongdoer. The questions whether she may bring suit
against her husband's employer for a tort committed by
the husband while in the scope of his employment, or may
sue the husband for torts committed by his employee, are
as yet unanswered in Maryland. In the first case, no question of public policy would stand in the way of such suit.
The majority of the courts in this country have held that
she cannot maintain such an action,2 but an ever-increasing minority, reaching a more desirable result, have allowed
such suits holding that the employer may not take advantage of the immunity of the employee.
In the second
case supposed, it is fairly clear that such an action would
not be allowed under the announced doctrine of public policy adhered to by the Maryland courts.
The implications arising from the decision in the principal case are numerous. Cases may be supposed from
those where the partnership consists of the husband and
an adult son, where it is clear no action will lie, to those
where the suit is against a joint stock company or business trust in which the husband is a share-holder. A logical extension of the rule in the principal case would certainly bar such action, yet it is inconceivable that the court
"Carter, The Corporation as a Legal Entity (1919) 232.
"See 37 A. L. R. 165; 56 A. L. R. 331; 64 A. L. R. 296.
'See (1935) 21 Corn. L. Q. 157, 165.
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would refuse to adopt the entity theory in such a situation.2" Between these two extremes lies the suit against
the limited partnership, and the suit against the large partnership, consisting of say fifteen or twenty members. It
is possible such suits may be allowed under the Statute2 9
which permits suits to be brought against an unincorporated association of seven or more members in the firm
name, and also provides, that such an action "shall not
abate by reason of the . . . legal incapacity of any officer
or member of such association. . . ." But the statute was
probably not intended to embrace ordinary partnerships,
and literally read, it does not give much hope. It does, however, plainly recognize such an association as an entity for
the purposes of procedure.
When we analyze the reasons for permitting suits between spouses on contracts and for property torts while
those for personal torts are forbidden it should seem that
a further exception should be made for personal tort suits
against the partnerships, employers of the spouse, and
against spouses for torts by employees.
It may be justifiable to reject suits between spouses
for personal torts allegedly committed directly by the defendant spouse because such suits are so likely to arise
out of the intimate personal relations of the spouses which
are undesirable of being dragged into the courtroom. It
is impractible to set up an objective standard to distinguish
those personal torts which do involve intimate relations
from those which do not and therefore could safely be litigated in court. So it is that all personal tort suits must
be rejected.
But suits in contract and for property torts are so
little likely of involving intimate relations that litigation
concerning them may safely be permitted without impairing the relations of the spouses. Thus has the distinction
been drawn in Maryland.
Why cannot it be said that the personal torts of a partFor procedural purposes, such an association is treated as an entity, see
Md. Code, Art. 73, Sec. 31.
Md. Code, Art. 23, See. 104.
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nership, or by the husband as an employee of someone
else, or by the employee of the husband, similarly form
a clear cut group very unlikely of growing out of intimate
relations between the spouses and which may safely be demarcated from personal torts generally so that litigation
concerning them should be permitted.
It is as simple to draw the line between these torts
and other personal torts as it has already proven to be
to draw the distinction between all personal torts on the
one hand and the property tort and contract situations on
the other.
CONTRACT FOR LIFE-TIME EMPLOYMENT HELD
VOID FOR INDEFINITENESS OF SUBJECT
MATTER-BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAIL1
ROAD COMPANY V. KING
Plaintiff -appellee was injured while employed as brakeman by the defendant-appellant company. An officer of the
company urged plaintiff not to enter suit, saying: "We are
going to give you a job for life, if you listen to me; there
is something you can have at Baltimore or at Washington,
as switchman, lots of jobs."
After recovering from his
injury, plaintiff was employed by the defendant as switchman for twenty-two years with only a single interruption
of three months when plaintiff was "on call". In 1931 the
job was abolished, plaintiff was discharged and he brought
suit for damages for the breach of the oral contract of
the defendant to employ him for life in consideration of
his forbearance to sue on the claim. Judgment was given
for the plaintiff in the lower court and defendant appealed.
Held: Judgment reversed. Since neither the type of work
to be done, nr the wages to be received were specified, the
contract was too indefinite to be enforced.
The problem raised by the principal case is not entirely
new in Maryland. It was first considered in Heckler v.
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company,2 where the injured
'168 Md. 142, 176.Atl. 626 (1935).
167 Md. 226, 173 At. 12 (1934).

